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make his treatment of the subject quite inadequate. He is altogether scornful of any other formulæ, which, however, might go some way to explain this "mechanical laughter." It is gross assumption that laughter is primarily social, and in any case the point is, what is laughter? M. Bergson only takes an obvious effect of much laughter, as its purpose; if we deny this initial assumption, his whole discussion is vitiated.

He discusses a very narrow range of the comic. From his first example, a man slipping in the street, to the pessimistic sentence with which he concludes (quoted above), we have one type of the comic alone, of which the former is sufficiently representative. Of the humorous we see little and hear next to nothing, but it cannot be sharply divorced from the comic and it violates many of his canons. He talks as if a man could never be comical to himself. He neglects (and illustrates!) the difference of national taste in comedy, save so far as he can connect it with the variety of national social customs. He neglects any laughter that is spontaneously hearty: his basis is the dogma that laughter is a social corrective, which he supports by special pleading from a realm of evolution which is purely speculative. He begins by remarking how elusive is the spirit of laughter, which no definition can imprison, and he does make this appear very convincing; for he himself would make what is essentially alive, dead and mechanical.

The book would repay a much more detailed analysis, and it is perfectly delightful to read.

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FROM RELIGION TO PHILOSOPHY. By F. M. Cornford. London : Arnold, 1912. Pp. xx, 276.

Almost all human beings who have reached any degree of civilization hold, more or less confusedly, a variety of opinions which it would be possible to classify as attempts to solve the great enigmas of existence: Of what is the world made? What is the nature and destiny of the soul? Is there one God or many, and what is the nature of the connection between him (or them) and man and the world? What sort of things are right and wrong, good and evil, and why? We might then sort the solutions into two classes. In so far as the ideal which a

man sets before himself is that of excluding emotional bias from the consideration of such problems and of accepting only what is reasonable or demonstrable, we have philosophy or science; and in so far as the ideal of demonstrability is blurred, and stress is laid on the emotions, we have religion. In practice neither ideal is ever attained in its purity; also the two classes shade into one another in such a way that it is hard to say at what point the one ends and the other begins, although it is clear enough that as a general rule religions precede philosophies in order of time. But is the sequence causal as well as temporal? And, going further back, can we discover any general causes for the primitive religious beliefs of mankind? Mr. Cornford answers both these questions. In discussing the genesis of religion, he does not propound any original view, but merely adopts the facts and theories of such writers as J. G. Frazer, Lévy-Bruhl, and Emile Durkheim; but in the other part of his task, where he traces a chain of causal connections between the most primitive religious ideas and the philosophical and scientific speculations of the Greeks, he is trying to do something which has never been done before. The result is a book of the profoundest interest and of great originality.

The story he unfolds is roughly as follows. If we wish to picture to ourselves what a primitive society is like before the existence of anything that can properly be called religion, we must realize that the individual savage has scarcely any consciousness of his own apart from the collective consciousness of his group. The 'primitive magical fact' is intense emotional activity, collectively experienced by a group; there is no idea of a God as distinguished from the group, and instead of religious ritual we have a set of common duties and magical observances centred on the totem of the tribe. This is the pre-religious or magical stage. To understand it fully, we must remember that the group is more than a mere collection of human beings. The human beings are divided into exogamous phratries, each of which includes its respective totem; that is to say, the emu-man is not differentiated from the emu-bird, whose garb he assumes on occasion in the mimetic dance. The whole universe is in this way parcelled out into segments, each of which contains, as in a 'magical continuum,' the material elements, the plants or the animals, as the case may be, together with the human beings allotted to it. In totemism nature and

society are conceived as continuous, for the clan and its totem-species together are one, united by one blood. And in the fact that the boundaries of the various segments are demarcated by taboos, we see the origin of the emotions connected with right and wrong: the emu-man has no private individuality distinct from the collective emotion aroused by the due observance of his functions as an emu.

Religion proper only begins with the dawning of a distinction between myself and the social consciousness, and the first religious representation is an externalization of this collective consciousness, such as we find in the Melanesian *mana* and the North American *wakonda*,—a subtle, homogeneous, fluid form of matter uniting the social group in a bond of kinship. From this there arise by a process of fission two further collective representations, that of God and that of the human soul. The original ‘magical continuum’ dividing into two ‘pools’ of human and non-human force, totemism dies out; the magical group ceases to coincide with the clan, and becomes a sort of church, united by its *mana* and consisting of persons with secret and exceptional powers, whose influence can extend over the whole of nature. Here we are already on the verge of history; in Greece the Kouretes and Idaean Daktyls seem to have been such groups. The members of the group are divine, and their collective soul is a *dæmon*. And, by a parallel process, another kind of *dæmon* comes into being simultaneously,—the *dæmon* of an element or department of nature, connected, not with a human group, but with a spatial division.

These two conceptions are very important, as they are the respective sources of the two main currents, first of Greek religion, and then of Greek philosophy. The type of the first kind of *dæmon*,—the Mystery God, or *dæmon* of a human group,—is Dionysus, who represents the life of all animate nature as it flows round the recurrent cycle of the year. The framework of the conception is essentially temporal, as opposed to the framework of spatial departments from which the gods of Olympus are developed. The Mystery God always remains human as well as divine, and he is worshiped with orgiastic and sacramental ritual. The Olympians, on the other hand, drift beyond the reach of human emotions into an immutable heaven; there is no mystical communion with them; they are worshiped with sacrifice; they are anthropomorphic and many in number,

whereas the Dionysiac scheme tends toward pantheism and monotheism. Thus in Homer we find the world spatially distributed among the Olympians in a system of provinces, the principle of division being 'Moira,' or fate, an impersonal entity above and behind the gods. As the gods develop, the supremacy of the more primitive Moira diminishes, but it leaves its traces behind it in, for instance, such a representation of taboo as the river Styx ('shuddering'), 'the great oath of the gods,' which fences off their different departments.

Now although by the time of Thales the Olympians have long receded into the remote heaven, to which from the beginning they were doomed by their origin in spatial conceptions, yet the first Ionian philosophers took the primitive religious framework for granted. Their speculation springs naturally from Olympianism; it is dominated by spatial externality, it is pluralistic, it tends toward atomistic materialism. These early thinkers could not escape the collective representation out of which the Olympians sprang,—the conception, namely, of a primitive life-stuff parcelled out into departments as of right. This primary stuff whether it be 'air or mist' (Anaximenes), 'the limitless' (Anaximander), or 'water' (Thales), is ordered into elements by a process which is conceived as moral, because it is taken over from the prereligious notion of a segmentation of the universe by taboos, the transgression of which constitutes 'injustice.' Thus, Anaximander's 'limitless,' with its four subordinate elements, corresponds to a totemic tribe of four clans: the cosmology is a transcript of the social structure; the primary datum of philosophy is supplied by inherited collective representations. I have no space to trace here the progress of the scientific Ionian school, working on this primary datum, to its conclusion in the atomism of Democritus. I suspect that Mr. Cornford considers it a rake's progress; at any rate, he sums it up as a product of the same temperament as Olympian theology, and, calling it pluralistic, spatial, rationalistic, and fatalistic, contrasts it with the other great development of Greek philosophy, the mystical tradition, the root of which, he urges, is equally to be sought in primitive religion.

The mystical tradition, in which the ideas, not of space, but of time and of number (the measure of time), are fundamental, is derived from the Dionysiac cult-society, a single group with a common life centred in its *dæmon*. Hence the

temporal continuity of life is prominent here, together with such notions as that of rebirth and of the Wheel of Time, which is also the Wheel of Right; these give rise to the doctrines of sin, retribution, and purification. For Heracleitus, in violent reaction against Ionian rationalism, the one reality in the flux is soul-substance, with the emphasis on its life in the cycle; and ultimately this soul-stuff, which is common to all things, is a representation of the collective consciousness. Then, in Pythagoreanism, the mystic's passion for unity finds expression in the doctrine of numbers: the tetractys is "the fountain and root of ever-springing nature," a formula combining the notion of rebirth with that procession out of unity into plurality which is characteristic of numerical series. There was, indeed, a dualistic tendency impelling Pythagoreanism towards atomism, just as Pythagoras himself, from having been the *dæmon* of his church, was in time removed to heaven; but here again I cannot pursue the thesis through all its ingenious details. I will only refer to Mr. Cornford's argument about Empedocles, whose two strange poems he treats as an heroic attempt to reconcile mysticism with Ionian science. One of these poems is religious, the other cosmological, and their author is usually taken as an example of the indifference of these early thinkers to inconsistencies between their religion and their philosophy; Mr. Cornford, on the contrary, claims him as signally illustrating his theory that "cosmological views were almost entirely dictated by and deduced from religious convictions" (p. 240). Finally, a word as to his treatment of Platonism, "the last and greatest attempt to formulate the mystical faith in rational terms." Plato's 'ideas' go straight back to primitive religion, for they are not mere concepts, but 'group-souls' emerging from their class just as the *dæmon* emerges from the social group to be the depositary of its collective consciousness. Mr. Cornford does not go all the way with Professor Burnet and Professor Taylor (see my review of Professor Taylor's "*Varia Socratica*" in this JOURNAL for October, 1912) as to Socrates's Orphic and Pythagorean affiliation; and it is interesting to note that, as to Plato, he takes up a less extreme position than those writers. He suggests that Plato did not learn the theory of ideas direct from Socrates; at the time of Socrates's death he was not a Pythagorean adept, but soon after the death he became intimate with the inner circle of mystic friends, and was converted to the doc-

trines which, in the "Phædo," he then proceeded to put into the master's mouth with more or less historical verisimilitude.

The main object of Mr. Cornford's theory is to show that there is method in the apparent madness of the early Ionian cosmologies, by proving that they are formed under the influence of collective religious representations. Although many parts of his argument are very valuable and interesting, I do not feel that it is convincing as a whole. In the first place, it is doubtful whether the theories of Lévy-Bruhl and Durkheim, whom he unreservedly follows, as to the psychology of primitive men, are the last word on the subject. But, even if we take these theories as substantially correct, what reason is there to think that in 600 B. C. the intellectual atmosphere of Miletus, that go-ahead commercial community, was pervaded by primitive collective representations to such an extent that a Milesian mathematician could not theorize about the universe except under their spell? Mr. Cornford has made out a good case for the derivation of Olympian theology from a departmental system, and perhaps also for the reduction of Orphism and of Pythagoreanism (on its religious side) to the magical cult-society; but it does not seem to follow that scientific thought, even in its first dawn, was dominated by these conceptions, enfeebled as they must have been by the lapse of unnumbered centuries. His cardinal argument is that the early cosmologies cannot be accounted for otherwise. When we find the fathers of philosophy not making those rudimentary observations on physical and psychical facts that we should expect, but dogmatically announcing, for instance, that everything is divided into four elements, and these into pairs of contraries, the only possible inference, it is said, is that they were influenced by religious tradition, since otherwise these fantastic ideas would never have occurred to them. I do not feel sure that these are not just the sort of ideas that would in any case be likely to occur to an early system-maker. One point, however, is peculiarly impressive,—the ethical significance with which the cosmogonies are invested. When Anaximander speaks of injustice and retribution in connection with the separation of the elements, it is tempting to trace here, with Mr. Cornford, a survival of the prehistoric moulding of emotion by the force of departmental taboos.

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